Sandboxed Agent Execution
Overview
A runtime boundary for agents that can run code, touch files, browse, call tools, or influence production systems.
Conference Context
- Sandbox talks argue that agent reliability depends on designed execution environments, not only model prompting.
- Security sessions connect permissions, provenance, network access, and rollback to agent safety.
- The strongest source layer is official schedule plus event recordings and slide evidence; OCR-only details remain supporting evidence.
Implementation Pattern
- Classify the task risk before choosing process, container, microVM, network, and secret boundaries.
- Default to no ambient credentials and explicit network egress rules.
- Capture commands, diffs, artifacts, resource usage, and exit conditions.
- Require human approval before production mutation unless the policy explicitly allows autonomous action.
- Retain incident evidence so sandbox policy can be tightened after failures.
Evidence
- ai sandboxes - Topic synthesis
- agent security - Topic synthesis
- what security boundaries should agents have - Question layer
- 2026 06 30 samuel colvin your agent needs a sandbox not a desert - Official schedule
- 2026 06 30 robert brennan sandboxes aren t optional runtime isolation patterns for coding agents at scale - Official schedule
- 2026 06 30 ivan burazin kubernetes is not your sandbox - Official schedule
Evidence Boundary
This is a reusable workflow synthesized from the linked conference evidence. Treat it as a recommended implementation pattern, not as a direct quote from any single talk.